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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  The 
Government appeals the District Court‘s order dismissing a 
RICO indictment of attorney Paul W. Bergrin and his co-
defendants.  Because the indictment adequately pleaded a 
RICO violation, we will reverse and remand. 
I 
 Bergrin is a high-profile defense attorney and former 
federal prosecutor from New Jersey who now stands accused 
of leading an extensive criminal enterprise from 2003 through 
2009. 
 On November 10, 2009, a federal grand jury in 
Newark, New Jersey returned a thirty-nine count superseding 
indictment charging Bergrin and seven co-defendants with a 
 4 
 
host of offenses, all allegedly connected through an 
―association-in-fact‖ enterprise called the Bergrin Law 
Enterprise (BLE or Enterprise).  According to the indictment, 
the BLE was comprised of five individuals—Paul Bergrin; 
Yolanda Jauregui; Thomas Moran; Alejandro Barrazo-Castro; 
and Vicente Esteves—and four corporations—the law firm 
Pope, Bergrin & Verdesco, PA (PB&V); the Law Office of 
Paul W. Bergrin, PC; Premium Realty Investment Corp., Inc.; 
and Isabella‘s International Restaurant, Inc.1 
 The indictment alleged that Bergrin was the leader of 
the BLE and played an instrumental role in all of the 
Enterprise‘s six criminal schemes.  His co-defendants‘ 
alleged roles differed by scheme, with each having significant 
involvement in at least one scheme and little or no 
involvement in others.  The six alleged schemes, also listed as 
―racketeering acts,‖ are summarized below: 
1. Racketeering Act One:  In 2003 and 2004, 
Bergrin, as a partner in PB&V, represented a 
client with the initials ―W.B.,‖ who was being 
held on federal drug trafficking charges.  W.B. 
informed Bergrin during a private attorney-
client visit that ―K.D.M.‖ was the government‘s 
key witness against him.  Bergrin relayed that 
information to W.B.‘s drug associates along 
with his own message that if they killed 
K.D.M., he could assure that W.B. escaped 
prison, but if they did not, W.B. would spend 
                                                 
1
 Three defendants named in the indictment—Alonso 
Barraza-Castro, Jose Jiminez, and Sundiata Koontz—were 
charged with individual substantive crimes, but were not 
alleged to be part of the BLE. 
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the rest of his life in jail.  Those associates 
subsequently murdered K.D.M. 
2. Racketeering Acts Two and Three:  In 2008 and 
2009, Bergrin, through his law firm, Law Office 
of Paul W. Bergrin, PC, represented Esteves, 
who was charged with federal drug crimes in 
Monmouth County, New Jersey.  ―Under the 
guise of providing legitimate attorney services,‖ 
Enterprise members Bergrin, Jauregui, and 
Moran assisted Esteves in arranging to have a 
witness against him murdered.  Members of the 
BLE solicited a hitman to locate and kill the 
witness, traveled to meetings with the hitman, 
offered to assist the hitman in obtaining a gun, 
instructed the hitman on how to commit the 
murder, and then received $20,000 in cash for 
their services to Esteves. 
3. Racketeering Act Four:  In 2009, Bergrin, 
through his law firm,  Law Office of Paul W. 
Bergrin, PC, represented a client with the 
initials ―R.J.,‖ who was charged with robbing 
―M.P.‖ in Essex County, New Jersey.  
Enterprise members Bergrin, Jauregui, and 
Moran bribed and assisted in bribing M.P., who 
was to testify for the government against R.J.  
They did so by causing a third party, ―M.C.,‖ to 
participate in telephone conversations with 
M.P., after which they paid M.P. $3,000 in cash 
to change his/her testimony. 
4. Racketeering Acts Five, Six, and Seven:  From 
2005 to 2009, Bergrin, Jauregui, and Barraza-
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Castro—along with several non-Enterprise 
members—trafficked in kilogram quantities of 
cocaine ―[u]nder the guise of conducting 
legitimate business‖ at Law Office of Paul W. 
Bergrin, PC, PB&V, Premium Realty 
Investment Corp., Inc, and Isabella‘s 
International Restaurant, Inc.  As part of the 
operation, a ―stash house‖ was maintained at 
Isabella‘s in Newark. 
5. Racketeering Acts Eight and Nine:  In 2004 and 
2005, Bergrin, through his law firms, Law 
Office of Paul W. Bergrin, PC and PB&V, 
represented a client with the initials ―J.I.,‖ who 
ran a prostitution business in New York.  
Bergrin helped J.I. evade New Jersey Parole 
Board restrictions by telling the Board that J.I. 
worked at the Law Office of Paul W. Bergrin, 
PC.  Bergrin also supported that claim with 
false paychecks drawn on Premium Realty 
Investment Corp., Inc. accounts.  When J.I. was 
arrested again, Bergrin took over the 
prostitution business, but he too was caught and 
charged in New York.  Following Bergrin‘s 
arrest for his role in the business, Jauregui 
solicited M.C.—i.e., the ―third party‖ in 
Scheme Three—to murder a witness against 
Bergrin.  Jauregui then supplied M.C. with 
information about the witness and paid him/her 
$10,000. 
6. Racketeering Acts Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and 
Thirteen:  In 2005 and 2006, Bergrin and 
Jauregui committed and assisted others in 
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committing wire fraud relating to the sale of 
real estate properties to individuals they knew 
to have fraudulently obtained mortgage loans.  
They did so ―[u]nder the guise of conducting 
[the] legitimate business‖ of the Law Office of 
Paul W. Bergrin, PC and Premium Realty 
Investment Corp., Inc.  At least one of the 
properties was owned by Bergrin and Jauregui 
through Premium Realty.  Bergrin and other 
attorneys from the Law Office of Paul W. 
Bergrin acted as closing attorneys on the 
transactions. 
The indictment also alleged the following seven purposes of 
the Enterprise, which we quote in full: 
 a. providing The Bergrin Law 
Enterprise and its leaders, members and 
associates with an expanding base of clients for 
legal and illegal services; 
 b. generating, preserving and 
protecting The Bergrin Law Enterprise‘s profits 
and client base through acts of, among other 
things, witness tampering, murder, conspiracy 
to commit murder, traveling in aid of 
racketeering enterprises, bribery, drug 
trafficking, prostitution, wire fraud, and money 
laundering. 
 c. protecting and preserving 
defendant PAUL BERGRIN‘s status as a 
licensed attorney; 
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 d. enhancing defendant PAUL 
BERGRIN‘s reputation as a criminal defense 
attorney; 
 e. promoting and enhancing The 
Bergrin Law Enterprise and its leaders‘, 
members‘ and associates‘ activities; 
 f. enriching the leaders, members, 
and associates of The Bergrin Law Enterprise; 
and 
 g. concealing and otherwise 
protecting the criminal activities of The Bergrin 
Law Enterprise and its members and associates 
from detection and prosecution. 
 Bergrin, Jauregui, Moran, and Barazza-Castro were 
each charged in Count One with violating RICO, 18 U.S.C. 
§1962(c), and in Count Two with conspiring to violate RICO, 
§ 1962(d).
2
  Bergrin, Jauregui, Moran, and Esteves were also 
                                                 
 
2
 Section 1962(c) states: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by 
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or 
the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 
enterprise‘s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful 
debt. 
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charged in Count Three with the commission of violent 
crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR), 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a).
3
 
 Bergrin and his co-defendants moved to dismiss the 
RICO and racketeering-based counts.  On April 7, 2010, the 
District Court heard oral argument on whether the 
Government alleged in its indictment facts sufficient to 
support RICO charges.  Two weeks later, the District Court 
granted the motions to dismiss Count One, finding that the 
                                                                                                             
Section 1962(d) criminalizes ―conspir[ing] to violate 
any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of 
this [§ 1962].‖ 
 
3
 The VICAR statute applies to anyone who: 
 
as consideration for the receipt of, or as 
consideration for a promise or agreement to 
pay, anything of pecuniary value from an 
enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, or 
for the purpose of gaining entrance to or 
maintaining or increasing position in an 
enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, 
murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a 
dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in 
serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to 
commit a crime of violence against any 
individual in violation of the laws of any State 
or the United States, or attempts or conspires so 
to do. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). 
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indictment did not adequately allege a racketeering 
―enterprise‖ or a ―pattern of racketeering activity.‖  United 
States v. Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d 503, 519 (D.N.J. 2010).  
Because charges of conspiracy to violate RICO and VICAR 
both require elements of an underlying RICO charge, Counts 
Two and Three were dismissed as well.  Id.  The Government 
filed this timely appeal.
4
 
II 
 ―[W]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment, 
our standard of review is mixed, employing plenary or de 
novo review over a district court‘s legal conclusions, and 
reviewing any challenges to a district court‘s factual findings 
for clear error.‖  United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 
156 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 
F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir.1998)).  ―A finding is clearly erroneous 
when[,] although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
[body] on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.‖  United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Concrete 
Pipes & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension 
Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
III 
A 
                                                 
 
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 because Bergrin and his co-defendants were 
charged with violating ―offenses against the laws of the 
United States.‖  We have jurisdiction over the District Court‘s 
order dismissing the indictment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 
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 We begin our analysis by setting forth the 
requirements of a well-pleaded indictment and the rules 
governing a district court‘s review of a motion to dismiss. 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) requires an 
indictment to ―be a plain, concise, and definite written 
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged.‖  The Supreme Court has explained that ―the Federal 
Rules ‗were designed to eliminate technicalities in criminal 
pleadings and are to be construed to secure simplicity in 
procedure.‘ . . . While detailed allegations might well have 
been required under common-law pleading rules, . . . they 
surely are not contemplated by Rule 7(c)(1).‖  United States 
v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 110 (2007) (citations 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 
(1953)).  Likewise, we have held: 
[A]n indictment [is] sufficient so long as it ―(1) 
contains the elements of the offense intended to 
be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the 
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, 
and (3) allows the defendant to show with 
accuracy to what extent he may plead a former 
acquittal or conviction in the event of a 
subsequent prosecution.‖  United States v. 
Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314 (3d Cir.2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, ―no 
greater specificity than the statutory language is 
required so long as there is sufficient factual 
orientation to permit the defendant to prepare 
his defense and to invoke double jeopardy in the 
event of a subsequent prosecution.‖ United 
States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 112 (3d 
Cir.1989). 
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United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 280 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 To determine whether an indictment ―contains the 
elements of the offense intended to be charged,‖ a district 
court may look for more than a mere ―recit[ation] in general 
terms [of] the essential elements of the offense.‖  United 
States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 685 (3d Cir. 2002).  A 
district court must find that ―a charging document fails to 
state an offense if the specific facts alleged in the charging 
document fall beyond the scope of the relevant criminal 
statute, as a matter of statutory interpretation.‖  Id.; see also 
United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 162–66 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(indictment alleging ―failure to rectify misstatements of 
others‖ does not, as a matter of law, state an offense under 
securities statute that criminalizes omissions of information); 
Gov’t of V.I. v. Greenidge, 600 F.2d 437, 438–40 (3d Cir. 
1979) (indictment alleging assault on male companion of a 
rape victim does not, as a matter of law, state an offense 
under statute that criminalizes assaulting a rape victim). 
 A ruling on a motion to dismiss is not, however, ―a 
permissible vehicle for addressing the sufficiency of the 
government‘s evidence.‖  United States v. DeLaurentis, 230 
F.3d 659, 660–61 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  
―Evidentiary questions‖—such as credibility determinations 
and the weighing of proof—―should not be determined at 
th[is] stage.‖  United States v. Gallagher, 602 F.2d 1139, 
1142 (3d Cir. 1979).  Rather, ―[i]n considering a defense 
motion to dismiss an indictment, the district court [must] 
accept[] as true the factual allegations set forth in the 
indictment.‖  United States v. Besmajian, 910 F.2d 1153, 
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1154 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Boyce Motor Lines v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n.16 (1952)). 
B 
 Having reviewed the legal principles governing 
motions to dismiss indictments generally, we turn now to the 
specific question of what a RICO indictment must allege 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  In United States v. Irizarry, we 
elaborated on the pleading requirements thusly: 
To establish a § 1962(c) RICO violation, the 
government must prove the following four 
elements: ―(1) the existence of an enterprise 
affecting interstate commerce; (2) that the 
defendant was employed by or associated with 
the enterprise; (3) that the defendant 
participated . . ., either directly or indirectly, in 
the conduct or the affairs of the enterprise; and 
(4) that he or she participated through a pattern 
of racketeering activity.‖ 
341 F.3d 273, 285 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. 
Console, 13 F.3d 641, 652-653 (3d Cir.1993)).  We are also 
guided in our application of § 1962(c) by statutes and 
Supreme Court decisions that have more precisely defined the 
many operative words and phrases in the RICO law, 
including ―enterprise‖ and ―pattern of racketeering activity.‖ 
1 
 The United States Code defines an ―enterprise‖ as 
―any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other 
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated 
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in fact although not a legal entity.‖  18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).  
According to the indictment in this case, the BLE was ―a 
group of individuals and legal entities associated in fact.‖  
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Turkette, 452 
U.S. 576, 583 (1981)—and reaffirmed in Boyle v. United 
States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (2009)—that such an 
―[association-in-fact] enterprise is an entity, for present 
purposes a group of persons associated together for a 
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct,‖ and it 
―is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or 
informal, and by evidence that the various associates function 
as a continuing unit. . . . separate and apart from the pattern of 
activity in which it engages.‖  In Boyle, the Court added that 
―an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three 
structural features: a purpose, relationships among those 
associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to 
permit these associates to pursue the enterprise‘s purpose.‖  
129 S. Ct. at 2244.  The Court also listed a number of 
structural elements that the government need not prove to 
establish an ―enterprise‖: 
[A]n association-in-fact enterprise . . . . need not 
have a hierarchical structure or a ‗chain of 
command‘; decisions may be made on an ad 
hoc basis and by any number of methods-by 
majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, 
etc.  Members of the group need not have fixed 
roles; different members may perform different 
roles at different times. The group need not 
have a name, regular meetings, dues, 
established rules and regulations, disciplinary 
procedures, or induction or initiation 
ceremonies. While the group must function as a 
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continuing unit and remain in existence long 
enough to pursue a course of conduct, nothing 
in RICO exempts an enterprise whose 
associates engage in spurts of activity 
punctuated by periods of quiescence. Nor is the 
statute limited to groups whose crimes are 
sophisticated, diverse, complex, or unique; for 
example, a group that does nothing but engage 
in extortion through old-fashioned, 
unsophisticated, and brutal means may fall 
squarely within the statute‘s reach. 
Id. at 2245–46.5  
 In order to be ―employed by or associated with‖ a 
RICO enterprise, a defendant must be a ―person‖ legally 
distinct from the ―enterprise‖ with which the person is 
employed or associated.  Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. 
King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001).  The Supreme Court 
recognized in Cedric Kushner Promotions that one person 
and one wholly-owned entity can be distinct.  533 U.S. at 163 
                                                 
 
5
 Long before Boyle, we held in United States v. 
Riccobene that establishing an enterprise requires proof of an 
―ongoing organization‖ with a ―superstructure or framework,‖ 
members who ―each . . . perform a role in the group 
consistent with the organizational structure,‖ and ―an 
existence beyond that which is necessary merely to commit 
each of the acts charged as predicate racketeering offenses.‖  
709 F.2d 214, 221-24 (3d Cir. 1983), overruled by Griffin v. 
United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991).  To the extent that this 
holding is inconsistent with Boyle, it is no longer good law.  
But even if Riccobene were unaffected by Boyle, our decision 
in this appeal would remain the same. 
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(―The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct 
from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with 
different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal 
status.  And we can find nothing in the statute that requires 
more ‗separateness‘ than that. . . . [L]inguistically speaking, 
the employee and the corporation are different ‗persons,‘ even 
where the employee is the corporation‘s sole owner.  After 
all, incorporation‘s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal 
entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges 
different from those of the natural individuals who created it, 
who own it, or whom it employs.‖ (citations omitted)).  
Courts have also recognized that an ―association-in-fact‖ 
enterprise can exist—and satisfy the ―distinctiveness‖ 
requirement—when it is comprised of members that are a 
mixture of individual persons and ―entities that they control.‖  
See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (finding an ―enterprise‖ made up of a 
lawyer, his law firm, two police officers, and their respective 
police departments). 
2 
 A ―pattern of racketeering activity‖ is defined as 
―requir[ing] at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of 
which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the 
last of which occurred within ten years . . . after the 
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.‖  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(5).  It is the ―person‖ charged with the racketeering 
offense—not the entire enterprise—who must engage in the 
―pattern of racketeering activity.‖  See H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell 
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 244 (1989). 
 ―[T]o prove a pattern . . . a plaintiff or prosecutor must 
show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that 
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they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal 
activity.‖  Id. at 239 (emphasis in original).  ―Relatedness‖ 
can be shown through evidence that the criminal activities 
―have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, 
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are 
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not 
isolated events.‖  Id. at 240 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)).  
Crimes can be ―interrelated by [a] distinguishing 
characteristic[]‖ when they are ―committed pursuant to the 
orders of key members of the enterprise in furtherance of its 
affairs.‖  United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  ―Continuity‖ includes ―both a closed- and open-
ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated 
conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the 
future with a threat of repetition.‖  H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 241.  
―Closed-ended continuity‖ can be established ―by proving a 
series of related predicates extending over a substantial period 
of time.‖  Id. at 242.  A finding of ―open-ended continuity,‖ 
on the other hand, ―depends on whether the threat of 
continuity is demonstrated.‖  Id. (emphasis in original).  
Although ―[f]or analytic purposes [relatedness and continuity] 
. . . must be stated separately, . . . in practice their proof will 
often overlap.‖  Id. at 239. 
 ―Racketeering activity‖ is defined by 18 U.S.C. 
§1961(1) to include dozens of crimes, including ―any act or 
threat involving murder, . . . bribery, . . . or dealing in a 
controlled substance,‖ as well as ―any act which is indictable 
under . . . [18 U.S.C. §] 1343 (relating to wire fraud), . . . [18 
U.S.C. §] 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, 
or an informant), . . . [and 18 U.S.C. §] 1952 (relating to 
racketeering).‖  In keeping with Congress‘s intent, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that racketeering activities of 
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criminal enterprises are often quite diverse and can include 
predicate offenses ranging from loan sharking and theft to 
trafficking in illicit prescription drugs and counterfeiting 
music albums.  Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590 (―In view of the 
purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the 
statute, we are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless 
confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of 
organized crime . . . .‖ (citing Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 947 and 116 Cong. 
Rec. 592 (1970))).  Because § 1961(1) casts such a wide net, 
RICO‘s reach can be exceptionally broad. 
3 
 We are also guided by the Supreme Court‘s expansive 
interpretation of RICO.  In numerous instances, the Court has 
been asked to impose limits on how RICO may be applied, 
and it has consistently declined to do so.  Instead, the Court 
has repeatedly pointed to RICO‘s legislative history and 
§904(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
6
 as 
evidence that Congress intended to create a broad and 
powerful new statutory weapon for the federal government to 
wield against individuals like Bergrin and organizations like 
the BLE.  See Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2244–47 (7-2 decision 
rejecting limitation that ―enterprise‖ must have ―an 
ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of 
racketeering activity in which it engages‖); Cedric Kushner 
Promotions, 533 U.S. at 164–65 (unanimous decision 
rejecting limitation that president and sole shareholder of a 
company is not distinct ―person‖ from wholly-owned 
                                                 
6
 84 Stat. at 947 (―The provisions of this Title shall be 
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.‖). 
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company ―enterprise‖); Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 
510 U.S. 249, 256–62 (1994) (unanimous decision rejecting 
limitation that ―enterprise‖ must have ―an economic motive‖); 
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586–87 (1981) (8-1 decision rejecting 
limitation that ―enterprise‖ must be legitimate entity); see 
also H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 248–49 (―Congress drafted RICO 
broadly enough to encompass a wide range of criminal 
activity, taking many different forms and likely to attract a 
broad array of perpetrators operating in many different ways.  
It would be counterproductive and a mismeasure of 
congressional intent now to adopt a narrow construction . . . .  
RICO may be a poorly drafted statute; but rewriting it is a job 
for Congress, if it is so inclined, and not for this Court.‖); 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983) (―Congress 
selected [the] general term [―interest‖ in § 1963(a)] 
apparently because it was fully consistent with the pattern of 
the RICO statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth.‖). 
 With these definitions and points of reference in mind, 
we turn to the District Court‘s decision to dismiss the 
indictment in this case. 
C 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B) allows 
a district court to review the sufficiency of the government‘s 
pleadings on ―a motion alleging a defect in the indictment.‖  
The court is limited, however, in what it may consider during 
this analysis.  Its determination must be based on whether the 
facts alleged in the indictment, if accepted as entirely true, 
state the elements of an offense and could result in a guilty 
verdict.  DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d at 660–61 (―[A] pretrial 
motion to dismiss an indictment is not a permissible vehicle 
for addressing the sufficiency of the government‘s evidence. . 
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. . Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) [now 
12(b)(3)(B)] authorizes dismissal of an indictment if its 
allegations do not suffice to charge an offense, but such 
dismissals may not be predicated upon the insufficiency of 
the evidence to prove the indictment's charges.‖ (citations 
omitted)).  Generally speaking, it is a narrow, limited analysis 
geared only towards ensuring that legally deficient charges do 
not go to a jury. 
 The District Court dismissed the indictment of Bergrin 
and his alleged co-conspirators based on its determination 
that ―Count One . . . both fails to set forth a pattern of 
racketeering and an enterprise.‖  Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 
519.  Neither of these conclusions is correct; the indictment 
adequately alleges all of the sub-elements required to 
establish both a pattern of racketeering activity and an 
enterprise, as well as all of the other elements of a RICO 
offense.
7
 
                                                 
7
 Although some of the sub-elements are not explicitly 
discussed—for example, the indictment does not contain the 
words ―closed or open-ended continuity‖—the facts alleged 
are sufficiently numerous and detailed to ―apprise[] the 
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet‖ and, if 
proven, provide an ample basis for a guilty verdict.  See 
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (―A 
jury is entitled to infer the existence of an enterprise on the 
basis of largely or wholly circumstantial evidence.‖); cf. 
Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2244 (―Although an association-in-fact 
enterprise must have these structural features, it does not 
follow that a district court must use the term ‗structure‘ in its 
jury instructions.‖). 
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1 
 
 The indictment alleges that the BLE constituted a 
RICO enterprise because it states this element of the charged 
offense, is sufficiently specific both to advise the defense of 
what it must be prepared to defend against and to allow 
recognition of a double jeopardy problem in future cases, and 
contains facts that fall within the scope of the RICO statute as 
a matter of law. 
 According to the indictment, the BLE was an 
―association-in-fact‖ of five individuals and four corporations 
that met all of the sub-elements outlined in Turkette.  The 
indictment describes the BLE as a group of persons and 
entities that associated and engaged in a course of conduct 
(i.e., a pattern of racketeering activity) for several common 
purposes (e.g., to make money, expand its client base, etc.) 
and was an ―ongoing organization‖ (though an informal one) 
comprised of associates who operated as a unit to provide 
illicit services to Bergrin‘s clients and one another.  The 
indictment also alleges facts that satisfy the Boyle 
requirements: purpose, relationships among the members 
(though, again, relatively loose and informal), and longevity 
sufficient to enable the BLE to pursue its goals of, inter alia, 
making money and protecting its own members and criminal 
schemes. 
 Similarly, there are sufficient facts in the indictment to 
apprise the defense that the Government will seek to prove 
that the BLE is a distinct entity, not merely a different name 
for the individual RICO defendants. The Government alleges 
that the individual defendants (i.e., the ―persons‖) worked 
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together and in conjunction with multiple corporations to 
achieve long-term common goals, and thus each individual 
defendant was merely a part of, not an alter ego of, the 
―association-in-fact‖ enterprise.  As the Supreme Court noted 
in Cedric Kushner Promotions, ―[w]hether the Act seeks to 
prevent a person from victimizing, say, a small business, . . . 
or to prevent a person from using a corporation for criminal 
purposes, . . . the person and the victim, or the person and the 
tool, are different entities, not the same.‖  533 U.S. at 162 
(citations omitted).  Although Cedric Kushner Promotions 
dealt with the infiltration of legitimate businesses, not 
―association-in-fact‖ enterprises, the principle remains the 
same: if Bergrin and the other individual defendants are ―the 
persons,‖ the BLE is adequately alleged to be ―the tool‖ that 
Bergrin directed. 
 The allegations supporting the ―enterprise‖ element are 
not negated by the fact that the BLE pursued various 
predicate crimes.  Rather, the BLE‘s versatility provides even 
stronger evidence that it was an ongoing association formed 
to pursue criminal objectives.  See, e.g., Masters, 924 F.2d at 
1366;  (―The strongest evidence [of an enterprise] is the 
handling of the problem of dealing with [the leader‘s cheating 
wife].  When that problem arose, a loose-knit but effective 
criminal organization was in place ready to respond 
effectively by planning and carrying out a . . . crime that 
would have been beyond the capacities of the individual 
defendants acting either singly or without the aid of their 
organizations.‖). 
2 
 The indictment also alleges facts indicating that each 
individual defendant engaged in at least two predicate acts, 
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which is the basis for the assertion that each engaged in a 
―pattern of racketeering activity.‖8 
 First, it is undisputed that the indictment charges each 
RICO defendant with committing at least two predicate acts 
within the last ten years, thus certainly meeting the statutory 
threshold set forth in § 1961(5). 
 Second, the ―relatedness‖ sub-element of H.J. Inc. is 
satisfied because the indictment states that the predicate 
crimes were all committed for ―the same or similar purposes,‖ 
e.g., ―promoting and enhancing the Bergrin Law Enterprise 
and its leaders‘, members‘ and associates‘ activities; 
enriching the leaders, members and associates of the Bergrin 
Law Enterprise; and concealing and otherwise protecting the 
criminal activities of the Bergrin Law Enterprise.‖  
Furthermore, there are several ―distinguishing characteristics‖ 
that imply that the predicate crimes were ―not isolated 
events.‖  Most notably, four of the six schemes involved the 
performance of some kind of service for Bergrin‘s clients 
(e.g., murdering witnesses against two clients, bribing a 
                                                 
 
8
 The Supreme Court has recognized that the 
government may use the same evidence to prove the pattern 
of racketeering activity and the enterprise.  Turkette, 452 U.S. 
at 583; Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2246 n.5, 2247.  At the motion to 
dismiss stage, the District Court had to accept as true all 
allegations in the indictment, regardless of its uncertainty as 
to how the Government would prove those elements at trial.  
The question is merely whether the indictment put the 
defendants on notice as to the nature of the charges against 
them, and whether the facts, if proven, are sufficient as a 
matter of law for a jury to convict. 
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witness against another, and helping a fourth run an illicit 
business). 
 Moreover, the indictment alleges both closed- and 
open-ended continuity.  Regarding the former, the predicate 
offenses are alleged to have occurred over a ―closed period of 
repeated conduct,‖ i.e., six years during which six criminal 
schemes were executed.  Several of the schemes themselves 
occurred over a number of years and involved repeated 
conduct (e.g., Scheme Four: a four-year drug trafficking 
conspiracy, which involved three individuals, four companies, 
and multiple predicate acts such as conspiracy to distribute 
five kilograms or more of cocaine, distribution of 500 grams 
or more of cocaine, and maintaining drug-involved premises).  
As to the latter, the alleged number of schemes and the BLE‘s 
apparent willingness to engage in criminal acts to aid 
Bergrin‘s clients suggest that there is also a ―threat of 
continui[ng]‖ criminal activity in the future. 
 As was the case with the ―enterprise‖ element, the fact 
that the BLE‘s alleged schemes differed from one another 
does not establish that, as a matter of law, there was no 
pattern.  Congress intended for RICO to apply to individuals 
who, through involvement in an enterprise, commit any 
combination of the many and diverse predicate acts, whether 
the usual organized crime-type offenses (e.g., bribery, 
extortion, gambling), more violent crimes (e.g., murder, 
kidnapping), or more niche crimes (e.g., counterfeiting music 
or trafficking in illicit prescription drugs).  We are not alone 
in agreeing with Judge Posner‘s observation that ―[a] criminal 
enterprise is more, not less, dangerous if it is versatile, 
flexible, diverse in its objectives and capabilities.‖  See 
United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 566 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Masters, 924 F.2d at 1367); see also United States v. 
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Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 55 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 57 (2d Cir. 2008).  In short, ―[t]he acts 
of a criminal enterprise within the scope of the enterprise‘s 
evolving objectives form pattern enough to satisfy the 
requirements of the RICO statute.‖  Masters, 924 F.2d at 
1367. 
 We have also noted that ―RICO‘s pattern requirement 
ensures that separately performed, functionally diverse and 
directly unrelated predicate acts and offenses will form a 
pattern under RICO, as long as they all have been undertaken 
in furtherance of one or another varied purposes of a common 
organized crime enterprise,‖ Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 566, as 
was the case with the BLE.  Based on the kinds of 
commonalities listed in H.J., Inc.—e.g., common purpose and 
direction from common leadership—we, as well as other 
circuit courts of appeals, have found patterns of racketeering 
activity in cases with equally (and in some cases, even more) 
disparate predicate crimes.  See, e.g., id. (―The murder 
conspiracy predicate was, for purposes of the pattern 
requirement, legally related to the gambling and extortion 
predicates, and they to each other, because all were 
undertaken to further varied and diverse Scarfo enterprise 
purposes, namely, to control, manage, finance, supervise, 
participate in and set policy concerning the making of money 
through illegal means.  Each charged predicate was related 
one to the other also because each was carried out by Idone or 
members of his crew, pursuant to orders of ‗key members of 
the enterprise‘, either Idone or Scarfo.‖); Masters, 924 F.2d at 
1366–67 (finding pattern when defendants participated in 
kickback scheme between police departments and a law firm, 
bribery of police to ignore illegal gambling activity, and a 
conspiracy to commit and cover up the murder of one 
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enterprise member‘s cheating wife); Elliott, 571 F.2d at 884–
95 (finding a pattern when predicate acts included arson, 
counterfeiting titles to stolen cars, stealing Hormel meat 
products, attempting to influence the outcome of ―the stolen 
meat trial,‖ stealing Swift meat and dairy products, stealing a 
forklift and ditchwitch, stealing ―Career Club‖ shirts, 
engaging in illegal drug transactions, and plotting to steal 
fungicide). 
D 
 Because the indictment in this case alleged facts 
sufficient to charge Bergrin and his co-defendants with RICO 
violations, it should have survived a motion to dismiss, and 
the District Court erred in finding to the contrary. 
1 
 In our view, the District Court‘s principal error was its 
failure to accept as true all of the facts alleged in the 
indictment.  The District Court treated Panarella—which 
calls for courts to determine whether ―the specific facts 
alleged in the charging document fall beyond the scope of the 
relevant criminal statute, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation,‖ 277 F.3d at 685 (emphasis added)—as though 
it allows inquiry into what the Government will be able to 
prove at trial.  Such factfinding is impermissible at the motion 
to dismiss stage.  Id. at 681 (―For purposes of determining the 
sufficiency of the superseding information, we assume the 
truth of the . . . facts alleged.‖); Console, 13 F.3d at 650 (―The 
existence vel non of a RICO enterprise is a question of fact 
for the jury.‖). 
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 In granting Appellees‘ motions to dismiss, the District 
Court relied in part on findings that the indictment failed to 
allege a common purpose or other commonality among the 
predicate acts.
9
  On these points, the Court openly weighed 
the evidence and questioned the Government‘s ability prove 
that all of the purported members of the enterprise shared the 
alleged common purposes.  The Court began by asserting 
that, ―[a]lthough the Government attempts to tie together the 
disparate predicates by arguing that they each furthered the 
‗principal goals of the enterprise,‘ . . . the purposes offered in 
the Indictment undermine the assertion that the RICO persons 
share any such common objectives.‖  Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 
2d at 512.  The Court then listed four alleged purposes and 
concluded: 
Given these alleged objectives, it strikes the 
Court that each pertains to Paul Bergrin 
individually as an attorney. . . . The 
enhancement of Bergrin‘s reputation and the 
preservation of his law license are clearly of 
unique importance to Bergrin himself, as is the 
expansion of his law firm‘s client base. . . . [I]t 
strains credulity to argue, for example, that 
Alejandro Barraza-Castro, an alleged drug 
dealer, shared the aforementioned purposes 
regarding Bergrin‘s law license and his client 
base. 
 
                                                 
9
 This finding is especially problematic because, as 
discussed in Part III.B., supra, evidence of a common purpose 
can be used to prove both a ―pattern of racketeering activity‖ 
and an ―enterprise.‖ 
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Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
10
  On its face, the indictment 
contradicts the District Court‘s findings.  The indictment 
avers seven (not four) common purposes, all of which cohere 
in light of the Government‘s allegation that all the members 
of the BLE benefited from Bergrin‘s status as a licensed 
attorney because ―the special privileges granted to licensed 
attorneys‖ allowed them ―to engage in and assist Client 
Criminals to engage in criminal activities.‖  BLE members 
also, according to the indictment, shared the common purpose 
of ―enriching the leaders, members and associates of The 
Bergrin Law Enterprise; and concealing and otherwise 
protecting the criminal activities of The Bergrin Law 
Enterprise and its members and associates from detection and 
prosecution.‖  Moreover, the indictment alleges that certain 
entities (i.e., PB&V and the Law Office of Paul W. Bergrin, 
PC) were used to commit the predicate acts.  It also states, 
though admittedly without much elaboration, that the 
                                                 
 
10
 Similar examples can be found throughout the 
opinion.  For instance, the Court lists the six schemes and the 
individuals accused of being involved in their commission, 
making no mention of the corporations also allegedly 
involved, and then concludes: ―[T]his panoply of criminal 
activity has but one common denominator, Paul Bergrin . . . . 
[T]he Indictment‘s failure to set forth similar or common 
purposes, victims, manners of commission, or otherwise 
distinguishing characteristics relating these predicates 
warrants dismissal.‖  Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 512.  Again, 
without mentioning the common purposes or entities 
involved, the Court refers to the Kemo murder case (Scheme 
One), stating: ―This case shares nothing in common with the 
other schemes, save for the presence of Paul Bergrin.‖  Id. 
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predicate acts were committed ―[u]nder the guise of providing 
legitimate attorney services.‖ 
 The District Court also opined that ―[t]here is no core 
group alleged, other than Paul Bergrin himself,‖ id. at 516, 
and that ―‗The Bergrin Law Enterprise‘ as pled is essentially 
Paul Bergrin, the licensed attorney, by another name,‖ id. at 
518.
11
  These findings cannot be squared with the indictment, 
which identifies a number of BLE members, any combination 
of which a jury could find were the ―core group.‖12  
Moreover, the notion that the BLE ―is essentially Paul 
Bergrin‖ cannot be reconciled with the indictment‘s 
allegations that other individuals and entities joined together 
to form an ―association-in-fact‖ enterprise—i.e., a ―union or 
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 
entity.‖  18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).  Whether a jury will find that 
such an enterprise existed is an open question, but as a matter 
of law, the Government pleaded facts sufficient to support 
such a finding.  The District Court was obliged to accept as 
those allegations as true. 
 
                                                 
11
 See also id. at 517 (―[L]ooking at the schemes 
alleged in the Indictment by date and by defendant, the facts 
belie any assertion that an enterprise existed before, during, or 
after [The BLE‘s alleged] growth and diversification.‖). 
 
12
 Although reasonable minds might differ as to 
whether Moran or Isabella‘s International Restaurant were 
―core‖ members, the indictment alleges that Bergrin and one 
of his law firms were involved in every racketeering act, and 
that Jauregui joined in four of the six schemes. 
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2 
 In addition to making impermissible factual findings, 
the District Court also penalized the Government for failing 
to allege facts that are unrelated to any required element of a 
RICO offense.  For example, the Court suggested that, to 
constitute a ―pattern,‖ the predicate acts must be similar in 
ways not actually required by the statute or judicial precedent 
(e.g., that there must be similar methods employed or some 
temporal proximity linking the predicate acts).
13
  The Court 
also suggested that proving the existence of a distinct RICO 
enterprise requires the Government to show that the 
enterprise‘s goals do not primarily benefit one specific 
member and that its operations do not too heavily rely on the 
skill or status of one specific member.
14
  Lastly, the Court 
                                                 
13
 See, e.g., Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (―[I]t is 
clear from the nature of the allegations that the Kemo murder 
case shares little, if anything, in common with the methods 
allegedly employed in the commission of the other predicates. 
. . . [I]t is evident on the face of these schemes that they lack 
any similarity in method.‖); Id. at 513(―[T]he Indictment as 
pled offers a series of disconnected street crimes and white 
collar frauds carried out using divergent methods for distinct 
purposes at different times as the RICO ‗pattern.‘‖); Id. at 516 
(―There is no common criminal conduct; instead, the acts 
alleged range from prostitution to murder to mortgage fraud 
without any apparent overlap or coordination, again other 
than the presence of Paul Bergrin, over different periods of 
time.‖). 
 
14
 See, e.g., id. at 515 (―Each of the seven purposes 
pled in ¶ 7 of the Indictment inure to the benefit of Paul 
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opined that a RICO enterprise must have structure, defined 
leadership, organization, and history comparable to more 
traditional organized crime-type enterprises (e.g., La Cosa 
Nostra).
15
 
 These factual averments are not required to prove a 
RICO case.  See supra Part III.B.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
Bergrin, as discussed above with regard to the pattern of 
racketeering.‖); Id. at 518 (―Through its focus on the misuse 
of legal services, the Government ties this enterprise together 
through Bergrin‘s status as an attorney.  ‗The Bergrin Law 
Enterprise‘ therefore is simply Paul W. Bergrin, Esq., without 
whom, as the Indictment states, none of the criminal schemes 
would be possible.‖). 
 
15
 See, e.g., id. at 515 (―No structure, or at best a 
minimal structure, is pled in the instant Indictment with 
regard to ‗The Bergrin Law Enterprise.‘  Instead, the 
Government attempts to graft an enterprise onto the actions of 
Defendant Bergrin by alleging that he led ‗The Bergrin Law 
Enterprise.‘ . . . The Indictment, however does not describe 
what this leadership entailed.  Except for the labeling of 
Bergrin as the ‗leader,‘ there is no discussion of the roles of 
the other associates, other than their commission of illegal 
acts. . . . This pleading stands in stark contrast to the typical 
form of a RICO Indictment.  In an organized crime or union 
corruption RICO Indictment, for example, there is often a 
lengthy discussion of each associate‘s role in the enterprise 
and how the enterprise came to be. . . . There is no such 
pleading as to the history of the enterprise or the role of its 
members‘ roles here.‖ (citations omitted)). 
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in H.J., Inc. used a disjunctive list when explaining what 
constitutes evidence of a ―pattern of racketeering activity‖: 
―criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, 
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise 
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not 
isolated events.‖  492 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted).  The ―methods employed‖ need not be similar; in 
fact, it is hard to imagine how they could be similar in cases 
where the predicate acts themselves are fundamentally 
different (e.g., extortion, drug trafficking, gambling, murder, 
and counterfeiting music albums).  Boyle also makes clear 
that there need not be a rigid temporal relationship among 
predicate acts.  129 S.Ct. at 2245 (―While the group must 
function as a continuing unit and remain in existence long 
enough to pursue a course of conduct, nothing in RICO 
exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in spurts of 
activity punctuated by periods of quiescence.‖).  Neither the 
District Court nor the Appellees cite any authority that stands 
for the proposition that there is no ―enterprise‖ if an 
association-in-fact forms for purposes that primarily benefit 
one member or operates with total dependence on one 
member.  Finally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly, and 
most explicitly in Boyle, rejected the notion that a RICO 
enterprise must have the type of structure, defined leadership, 
organization, or history generally associated with traditional 
organized crime associations.  Id. at 2245–46; see also H.J., 
Inc., 492 U.S. at 243–44 (―[Continuous] associations include, 
but extend well beyond, those traditionally grouped under the 
phrase ‗organized crime.‘ . . . [T]he argument for reading an 
organized crime limitation into RICO‘s pattern concept, 
whatever the merits and demerits of such a limitation as an 
initial legislative matter, finds no support in the Act‘s text and 
is at odds with the tenor of its legislative history.‖). 
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3 
 Throughout its opinion, the District Court raised 
equitable or logistical concerns.  Because these concerns are 
either endemic to RICO prosecutions or involve the 
application of irrelevant legal standards, it was improper for 
the Court to dismiss the indictment for any of these reasons. 
 On several occasions, the District Court alludes to 
RICO‘s broad scope and the potential for the law to be 
misapplied so as to unfairly try and punish common criminals 
and conspirators who were not the original targets of the 
law.
16
  If we were writing on a blank slate circa 1971, the 
District Court‘s concerns might carry the day.  In the forty 
years since RICO was enacted, however, much has been 
written on the proverbial slate.  The Supreme Court has 
unwaveringly disagreed with the District Court‘s sincere 
                                                 
16
 See, e.g., Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (―[T]he  
Government admitted that the acts would be prejudicially 
joined under Rule 14(a). . . . These admissions speak volumes 
as to the disparate nature of the substantive crimes that, in 
effect, also serve as the racketeering predicates.  While the 
Government maintains that these wide-ranging crimes 
nonetheless fall within the ambit of a RICO pattern, to hold as 
much would be to condone the precise type of overreaching 
that courts and commentators have warned against since the 
enactment of RICO.‖); Id. at 516 n.15 (finding that if ―the 
common purpose of the enterprise is to break the law and the 
course of conduct is committing illegal acts . . . . [RICO] 
would convert any garden variety criminal conspiracy into a 
RICO enterprise, which would be true neither to the letter nor 
the spirit of the RICO statute‖). 
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policy concern and we must do likewise.  As we have noted, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that RICO is a 
powerful weapon that significantly alters the way trials are 
conducted in cases that involve racketeering acts committed 
by members of an enterprise.  Most recently, the Court in 
Boyle stated: 
Because the statutory language is clear, there is 
no need to reach petitioner‘s remaining 
arguments based on statutory purpose, 
legislative history, or the rule of lenity.  In prior 
cases, we have rejected similar arguments in 
favor of the clear but expansive text of the 
statute. See National Organization for Women, 
510 U.S., at 262, 114 S.Ct. 798 (―The fact that 
RICO has been applied in situations not 
expressly anticipated by Congress does not 
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates 
breadth‖ (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499, 105 
S.Ct. 3275, brackets and internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Turkette, 452 U.S. at 
589-591, 101 S.Ct. 2524. ―We have repeatedly 
refused to adopt narrowing constructions of 
RICO in order to make it conform to a 
preconceived notion of what Congress intended 
to proscribe.‖ Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & 
Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. ----, ----, 128 S.Ct. 
2131, 2145, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008). 
129 S. Ct. at 2246–47.  During oral argument in Boyle, the 
petitioner argued that too broad a reading of RICO amounts 
to ―overreaching‖ because it results in a conflation of 
conspiracy and enterprise: ―[C]onspirators are liable for the 
acts of their co-conspirators, which is the Pinkerton doctrine 
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which collapses 1962(c) into a general conspiracy statute, if 
you are going to define an enterprise principally by virtue of 
its common purpose.‖  Oral Argument at 58:13, Boyle v. 
United States, 129 S.Ct. 2237 (No. 07-1309), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2008/2008_07_1309/argument.  The Supreme Court, in 
keeping with its broad understanding of RICO, brushed this 
concern aside.  Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2246 (―Under § 371, a 
conspiracy is an inchoate crime that may be completed in the 
brief period needed for the formation of the agreement and 
the commission of a single overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.  Section 1962(c) demands much more: the 
creation of an enterprise‘-a group with a common purpose 
and course of conduct-and the actual commission of a pattern 
of predicate offenses.‖ (citation omitted)).  In the final 
analysis, irrespective of any logical or theoretical appeal to 
the District Court‘s concerns, they have been soundly rejected 
by the Supreme Court. 
 The District Court also was concerned about the 
difficulties of managing a complex multi-defendant, multi-
count criminal trial.
17
  Again, although this is an 
                                                 
17
 Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 511 n.10 (―The 
differences between these RICO predicates are not merely a 
pleading concern.  Thinking through the practicalities of trial, 
it concerns the Court that evidence of these different alleged 
criminal acts likely would pose evidentiary problems. . . . 
[T]he spillover prejudice from the introduction of each 
witness murder case [sic] in a trial of the other would give the 
Court serious pause.  Beyond this, the Government would 
introduce its mortgage fraud case and prostitution cases 
during the same megatrial.  The many and complex limiting 
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understandable concern for a trial judge, the fear that 
―complex limiting instructions . . . would confound the 
Court‖ is distinct from the question of whether an indictment 
alleges all of the elements of a crime. 
 Finally, the District Court analogized RICO to a more 
familiar legal framework by discussing how the various 
predicates would be analyzed under joinder and severance 
standards if they were tried as stand-alone offenses.
18
  The 
Court again had a rational reason for discussing joinder and 
severance under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.  The Government‘s indictment was 
somewhat unwieldy, charging all of the RICO and non-RICO 
                                                                                                             
instructions that would have to be employed as to the counts 
and defendants would confound the Court, let alone the 
jurors.‖). 
 
18
 See, e.g., Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 510–11 
(―There is little on the face of the Indictment demonstrating 
relatedness among the varied white collar frauds and street 
crimes offered by the Government as RICO predicates.  The 
Government even conceded as much during oral argument, 
admitting that these disparate acts could not be joined but for 
the allegation of a RICO enterprise. . . . [T]he  Government 
admitted that the acts would be prejudicially joined under 
Rule 14(a). . . . These admissions speak volumes as to the 
disparate nature of the substantive crimes that, in effect, also 
serve as the racketeering predicates.‖); Id. at 516–17 (―[T]he 
predicate acts themselves are so disparate in type and method 
that the Government conceded that they could not be properly 
joined under Rule 8(b) absent a RICO count.‖). 
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defendants with all of the RICO counts and underlying 
substantive crimes.  Faced with a handful of motions to sever, 
the Court needed to analyze these rules.  The misstep that the 
Court made, however, is that it did not merely assess whether 
the RICO counts and defendants could be tried along with the 
non-RICO counts and defendants.  Instead, it determined that 
the predicate crimes underlying the RICO counts could not all 
be joined in one trial without a RICO charge binding them 
together, and from that, it extrapolated that the predicates 
cannot establish a ―pattern of racketeering activity.‖  In this 
case, however, there was a RICO count, and the Supreme 
Court has interpreted ―pattern‖ such that it requires only 
―relationship and continuity,‖ broadly construed.  H.J., Inc., 
492 U.S. at 239.  There is no support in H.J., Inc. or 
elsewhere for the notion that the individual predicates crimes 
must all be joinable in one trial, and it was therefore improper 
for the District Court to consider such an inapplicable 
standard as part of its analysis of the alleged ―pattern.‖19 
III 
 For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District 
Court erred in dismissing the RICO and RICO-based counts.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the District 
                                                 
19
 Cf. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 567 (―Rule 8(b) . . . . 
permits joinder of defendants charged with participating in 
the same racketeering enterprise or conspiracy, even when 
different defendants are charged with different acts, so long 
as indictments indicate all the acts charged against each 
joined defendant . . . are charged as racketeering predicates or 
as acts undertaken in furtherance of, or in association with, a 
commonly charged RICO enterprise of conspiracy.‖). 
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Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
